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ERISA: PUNITIVE DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF
FIDUCIARY DUTY
Fiduciary duty principles are central to the protection provided by the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA or Act). The law is unsettled, however,
about whether Congress intended to extend punitive damages, a typical remedy for
breach offiduciary duty under the common law, to the applicable ERISA provision.
This Note argues that the plain meaning of the ERISA fiduciary duty provision, the
legislative history underlying the purposes and policies of the Act, and the availability
of punitive damages under analogous law, taken together, support the recovery of
punitive damages for a breach of ERISA's fiduciary duty provision.
INTRODUCTION
ON LABOR DAY, 1974, President Gerald Ford signed the Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA or Act),' pre-
dicting that it would provide significant benefits for labor-
management relations.2 ERISA, a complex Act regulating pension
plans,3 consolidates and refines the patchwork of federal regulation
that previously had governed such plans.4
There are approximately 450,000 private pension plans6 in the
United States. These funds comprise the largest single source of
funds for the New York Stock Exchange.7 Fiduciaries of pension
funds acquire nearly sixty-five percent of the corporate stocks and
bonds issued in capital markets.8 The magnitude of pension fund
activity and retirement security needs of American workers
1. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381
(1982) and scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. (1982)).
2. Statement on the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 10 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 1084 (Sept. 2, 1974).
3. ERISA supersedes all state laws "insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any
employee benefit plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). See Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Barnes, 571 F.2d
502 (9th Cir. 1978) (Congress intended ERISA to preempt the entire field of employee benefit
plan regulation).
4. See Lieben, The Coverage of Title I of ERISA: Some Recent Developments, 61 NEB.
L. REV. 428, 428-29 & nn.4-16 (1982).
5. Note, The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 and Union Influence in
Pension Fund Investment Decisions, 12 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 151, 152 (1984).
6. ERISA explicitly excludes "governmental plans" from coverage. 29 U.S.C.
§ 1003(b)(1). A "governmental plan" is a plan established or maintained by the government
of the United States, any state government, or any political subdivision or agency thereof for
the benefit of public employees. Id. § 1002(32).
7. Note, supra note 5, at 152.
8. Id.
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prompted Congress to reform federal pension regulation.9
In the eleven years since the passage of ERISA, thousands of
lawsuits filed under Title I of the Act have resolved many of its
interpretive ambiguities.' 0 One issue that remains unsettled, how-
ever, is whether ERISA permits a plaintiff to recover punitive dam-
ages for a pension fund manager's breach of fiduciary duty.
Courts have reached opposing conclusions in answering this
question. In Russell v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co.,II
the Ninth Circuit held that punitive damages against fiduciaries are
contemplated and justified by the Act, although under very "limited
circumstances." 12 The Eighth Circuit, in Dependahl v. Falstaff
Brewing Co., 3 gave a sweeping statement of the opposite view, say-
ing that "punitive damages are [not] provided for in ERISA."' 4
District courts also have split on this issue: some have permitted
punitive damage awards in conformity with Russell, 5 while others
have relied on Dependahl, denying personal liability for punitive
damages for breaches of fiduciary duty by plan managers.16 In re-
9. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a).
10. More than 3000 Title I lawsuits were filed in the first five years of ERISA's exist-
ence. Gallagher, Recent Developments in Concepts Relating to Fiduciary Liability, 16 FORUM
753, 753 (1981).
11. 722 F.2d 482 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 53 U.S.L.W. 4938 (U.S. June
25, 1985). Accord Winterrowd v. David Freedman & Co., 724 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1984). The
Tenth Circuit has declined to decide the issue. Carter v. Central States Pension Plan, 656
F.2d 575 (10th Cir. 1981).
12. Russell, 722 F.2d at 491-92.
13. 653 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir.) (dictum), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 968 (1981).
14. Id. at 1216. The court made this observation in dictum, as it was not required to
decide the general issue of punitive damages under ERISA. The court merely held that
punitives were inappropriate for conduct prohibited under 29 U.S.C. § 1140. Id. at 1216-17.
Dependahrs general statement that punitives are not recoverable under ERISA includes
within its scope the narrower principle that punitives are not recoverable against individuals
for breaches of fiduciary duty.
15. Jiminez v. Pioneer Diecasters, 549 F. Supp. 677, 680 (C.D. Cal. 1982); Bobo v. 1950
Pension Plan, 548 F. Supp. 623, 626 (W.D.N.Y. 1982); Free v. Gilbert Hodgman, Inc., 3
Employee Benefits Cas. 1010, 1012 (N.D. Ill. 1982), afl'd in part on other grounds, 732 F.2d
1331 (7th Cir. 1984); Eaton v. D'Amato, 581 F. Supp. 743, 747-48 (D.D.C. 1980); accord
Bittner v. Sadoff & Rudoy Indus., 490 F. Supp. 534, 536 (E.D. Wis. 1980); cf. VAW v. Fed-
eral Forge, Inc., 583 F. Supp. 1350, 1356-57 (W.D. Mich. 1984) (court awarded mental dis-
tress damages on the same rationale as Russell offers for punitives); Meyer v. Phillip Morris,
Inc., 575 F. Supp. 1232, 1235-36 (E.D. Mo. 1983) (violations of "technical requirements"
distinguishable from breaches of fiduciary duty).
16. The cases that have denied punitive damages usually cite Dependahl, but they do not
necessarily endorse Dependahl's blanket disapproval of punitive damages. See Cowden v.
Montgomery County Soc'y for Cancer Control, 591 F. Supp. 740, 753 (S.D. Ohio 1984)
(finding no fiduciary breach, but allowing possibility of punitives recovery under proper cir-
cumstances); Hechenberger v. Western Elec. Co., 570 F. Supp. 820, 822-23 (E.D. Mo. 1983)
(plaintiff did not allege degree of misconduct necessary to constitute a fiduciary breach).
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versing Russell, the Supreme Court left the issue of recovery of pu-
nitive damages by a plan unresolved. 17
This Note analyzes the split between the circuits. It begins by
outlining the fiduciary provisions of ERISA as well as the general
principles underlying fiduciary duty.18 It then analyzes the conflict-
ing judicial rationales that led to the split.1 9 In particular, this Note
examines the plain meaning of the ERISA fiduciary duty provi-
sion,2" the Act's legislative history, the underlying purposes and
policies of the Act,2" and the availability of punitive damages under
analogous law.22 This Note concludes that punitive damages are
recoverable under ERISA in suits against individuals based on
breach of fiduciary duty.
I. PREEMINENCE OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
A. Under ERISA
Title I of ERISA spells out the responsibilities of pension fund
Some cases could be read to allow punitive damages against fiduciaries, even though the court
denied punitive damages against a pension plan. See Diano v. Central States, Southeast &
Southwest Areas Health, Welfare & Pension Funds, 551 F. Supp. 861 (N.D. Ohio 1982)
(distinguishing between plan and fiduciary, quoting unreported case of Short v. Junior Steel
Co. Employees Pension Plan & Trust, No. CV80-844 NRP (C.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 1980)); Max-
field v. Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Health, Welfare & Pension Funds, 559
F. Supp. 158, 160 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (punitive damages claim dismissed because pension plan
would ultimately have been liable); see also PENS. REP. (BNA) No. 317, at A-13 (Nov. 17,
1980) (abstract of Short); cf. Hopkins v. New York Tel. Co., No. 82 Civ. 4461 (WCC)
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 1984) (available May 1, 1985 on WESTLAW, DCT database) (reserving
judgment on whether punitives reasonable).
One court has expressly denied punitive damages in an ERISA suit against an individual
fiduciary, specifically rejecting the statutory interpretation in Russell. Whitaker v. Texaco,
Inc., 566 F. Supp. 745, 750-52 (N.D. Ga. 1983). Several other courts have unequivocally
denied punitive damages in all ERISA cases. See Heine v. Clark Equip. Co., No. 82-C-1286
(N.D. Ill. Dec. 21, 1983) (available Nov. 10, 1984 on LEXIS, Genfed library, Cases file);
Wardle v. Central States, Southeast & Southwest Area Pension Fund, PENS. REP. (BNA) No.
239, at D-1 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 23, 1979), afl'd on other grounds, 627 F.2d 820 (7th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1112 (198 1); Bell v. Southern Or. Log Scaling & Grading Bureau, No.
76-431 (D. Or. Aug. 5, 1976) (available Nov. 10, 1984 on LEXIS, Genfed library, Cases file);
Hum v. Retirement Fund Trust, 424 F. Supp. 80, 82 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
17. "In light of this holding, we do not reach any question concerning the extent to
which [§ 1109] may authorize recovery of extracontractual compensatory or punitive dam-
ages from a fiduciary by aplan." (emphasis in original). Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co.
v. Russell, 53 U.S.L.W. 4938, 4941 n.12 (June 25, 1985), rev'g 722 F.2d 482 (9th Cir. 1983).
18. See infra notes 23-69 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 70-140 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 70-90 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 91-110 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 111-40 and accompanying text.
1985]
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fiduciaries.23 It encompasses the labor law provisions and provides
for the protection of employee benefit rights.24 It establishes com-
prehensive reporting and disclosure requirements,25 minimum fund-
ing,26 vesting and participation standards,2 7 stringent fiduciary
standards for those who handle benefit funds,2" and criminal and
civil liability for violations of the Act.29
Congress declared that the fiduciary responsibility provisions of
ERISA are central to Title I's protection of employee benefit
rights.
30
Any comprehensive program to prevent abuses in our private re-
tirement system must also focus on the area of fiduciary responsi-
bility . . . . Workers' pension funds deserve strong fiduciary
protections to insure that their interests are not subordinated to
the self-enriching intrigues of "insiders" to the plan. This bill
will establish judicially enforceable standards to insure honest,
faithful, and competent management of pension and welfare
funds.
3 1
Prior acts32 failed to adequately address the obligations and du-
ties of pension fund fiduciaries. Internal Revenue Code regulations
dealing with pension plans focused on the production of revenue
and the prevention of tax evasion. 33 The Labor-Management Rela-
tions Act addressed the narrow problem of employee fund diversion
by employers and union officials. 34 The 1958 Welfare and Pension
23. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1144 (1982). ERISA has three other titles. Title II, codified at
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. (1982), outlines the tax consequences of ERISA as an amend-
ment to the Internal Revenue Code, including the tax treatment of individual retirement
accounts (IRA's) and Keogh plans. Title III clarifies the jurisdiction of federal agencies and
establishes procedures for the joint administration of the Act by the Secretaries of Treasury
and Labor. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1242. Title IV establishes a retirement plan termination insur-
ance program administered by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). Id.
§§ 1301-1381.
24. Id. §§ 1001-1144.
25. Id. §§ 1021-1031.
26. Id. §§ 1081-1086.
27. Id. §§ 1051-1061.
28. Id. §§ 1101-1114.
29. Id. §§ 1131-1144.
30. Dobranski, The Arbitrator as Fiduciary Under the Employee Retirement Income Se-
curity Act of 1974: A Misguided Approach, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 65, 67 n.7 (1982).
31. 120 CONG. REc. 29,951 (1974) (statement of Sen. Ribicoff), reprinted in 3 SUB-
COMM. ON LABOR OF THE SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 94TH
CONG., 2D SEss., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECUR-
rrY ACT OF 1974, at 4795 (1976) [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
32. See supra note 4.
33. 120 CONG. REC. 29,956 (1974) (statement of Sen. Bentsen), reprinted il 3 LEGISLA-




Plans Disclosure Act purported to protect the pension participant,
but it only required the filing of limited information with the Secre-
tary of Labor and the furnishing of such information to employees
upon request.35 It lacked any substantive fiduciary standards and
relied on the "initiative of the individual employee to police the
management of his plan."
36
These regulatory gaps permitted widespread abuse within the
pension system. 37 The escapades of pension fund fiduciary George
Barasch epitomized the abuses that prompted pension fund regula-
tion reform.38 Barasch dominated two unions and their employee
benefit plans and effectively controlled approximately $15,500,000
of the members' money.39 He used this money to capitalize several
corporations and create a management firm to administer the pen-
sion funds.4 He also channeled various funds into several foreign
corporations, including "research foundations," which he had
created.41
Barasch diverted almost five million dollars of the employees'
money.42 For his efforts, he received an annual salary of $35,000
from the management firm, $407,000 in life insurance coverage, and
$54,098 per year for life in total retirement benefits.43 His pension
benefit alone was worth $796,925.4
Only after pressure from a Senate subcommittee as well as fed-
eral and state agencies did Barasch return $4.2 million to the em-
ployee benefit funds.45 However, he was never prosecuted because
he had broken no law.46 The Barasch episode and others like it
provided the primary impetus for the passage of ERISA. Accord-
ing to Senator Bentsen, one of the chief sponsors of the legislation,
ERISA "will protect workers from these kinds of fiduciary
abuses."'47
The broad fiduciary provisions of ERISA begin with an expan-
sive definition. A fiduciary is defined as one who "exercises any
35. Ia
36. Id. at 29,957, reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 31, at 4811.
37. Id., reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 31, at 4795.
38. Id. at 29,951, reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 31, at 4795.
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discretionary authority or discretionary control" over a plan or its
assets, gives investment advice for a fee, or has any discretionary
authority in a pension plan's administration.48
The definition of fiduciary has a broad sweep. It does not enu-
merate certain pension plan officers but instead defines a fiduciary in
a functional manner. Fiduciaries are, on one level, individuals who
exercise direct control over the plan's management and assets or
who give advice for a fee about investment. They are fiduciaries
based on the nature of their positions.49 Moreover, officers in a cor-
poration whose employees are covered by a plan may be fiduciaries,
if they have authority over the plan, even though they may not ever
have used that authority. Thus, individual officers who have only a
tangential relationship with the pension plan also find themselves
within ERISA's broad embrace:
In the context of plans with few participants, the term "fiduciary
. . ." may include not only the employer, the plan administrator
named in the plan and the trustee of a trusteed plan, but also the
officers and directors of the employer, any employee responsible
for administering the plan, the actuary, the accountant, the in-
vestment adviser, the lawyer, any other plan consultant, includ-
ing even an insurance agent instrumental in establishing the plan.
Indeed, the list of potential fiduciaries may be limited only by the
creativity of a claimant's lawyer and the facts and circumstances
of a particular claim.50
ERISA compels fiduciaries to perform several duties.5" They
must act for the exclusive purpose of "providing benefits to partici-
pants and their beneficiaries."52 Their standard of behavior is that
of the "prudent man acting in like capacity and familiar with such
matters."53 Fiduciaries must prudently diversify a plan's invest-
ments and comply with the plan documents,5" but are prohibited
from engaging in certain transactions "if they know or should
know" the transaction involves a "party in interest."55
If fiduciaries breach any of their duties, they are personally liable
for any resulting losses. 6 They must restore to the plan any profits
48. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (1982).
49. Gallagher, supra note 10, at 754.
50. Pillsbury, Employee Benefit Plan Claims Under ERISA, 55 CONN. B.J. 357, 375
(1981).
51. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (1982).
52. Id. § 1104(a)(1)(A)(i).
53. Id. § 1104(a)(1)(B).
54. Id. § 1104(a)(1)(C).
55. Id. § 1106(a).
56. Id. § 1109(a).
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made through use of the plan assets and are "subject to such other
equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate,"
including their removal as fiduciaries." Fiduciaries may also be lia-
ble for the acts or omissions of co-fiduciaries.5 s In addition, they
are subject to a bonding requirement59 and civil penalties if found to
be a party in interest to a prohibited transaction."
B. General Principles of Fiduciary Duty
Traditionally, fidiciaries have occupied a special place under the
law:
One is said to act in a "fiduciary capacity" or to receive money or
contract a debt in a "fiduciary capacity," when the business
which he transacts, or the money or property which he handles,
is not his own for his own benefit, but for the benefit of another
person, as to whom he stands in a relation implying and necessi-
tating great confidence and trust on the one part and a high de-
gree of good faith on the other part.
61
Such a special relationship imposes a stringent standard of behavior
on the fiduciaries. Chief Judge (later Justice) Cardozo articulated
the quintessential definition of this standard in Meinhard v.
Salmon:
62
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for
those acting at arm's length, are forbidden to those bound by
fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the
morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio
of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior.
63
This rigorous standard of behavior is enforced by liberal reme-
dies which are available for breach of a fiduciary duty. Awards are
not limited by the amount of damage inflicted by such breach.'
Indeed, significant penalties have been imposed upon a variety of
57. Id.
58. Id. § 1105.
59. Id. § 1112(a).
60. Id. § 1132(i).
61. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 564 (rev. 5th ed. 1979) (emphasis added); see also In re
Estate of Heilman, 37 Il. App. 3d 390, 396, 345 N.E.2d 536, 540 (1976) ("A fiduciary rela-
tion arises whenever confidence is reposed on one side, and domination and influence result
on the other; the relation can be legal, social, domestic, or merely personal."); Williams v.
Griffin, 35 Mich. App. 179, 183, 192 N.W.2d 283, 285 (1971) (fiduciary relation exists "when
there is a reposing of faith, confidence, and trust, and the placing of reliance by one upon the
judgment and advice of another").
62. 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928).
63. Id. at 464, 164 N.E. at 546.
64. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 109-10.
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breaching fiduciaries: 65  an agent under contract,66 a pre-ERISA
pension plan manager,67 a public employee, 68 and a corporate
employee.69
II. THE CASE FOR ALLOWANCE OF PUNITIVE
DAMAGE AWARDS
The debate over the grant of punitive damages under ERISA
centers on differing interpretations of the same three sources: ER-
ISA's actual language, its legislative history, and analogous case
law. Though Dependahl v. Falstaff Brewing Corp.,7° in denying pu-
nitive damages, merely cited other conclusory cases rather than an-
alyzing the relevant sources, 7' some district court cases that have
65. Historically, the first exceptions to the rule prohibiting punitive damages in contract
actions were in breaches of fiduciary duties by a "public utility" or by an employer. This was
due to the overpowering economic leverage possessed by these defendants. The plaintiffs
could do very little to protect themselves from the defendant's bad faith. Note, The Ex-
panding Availability of Punitive Damages in Contract Actions, 8 IND. L. Riv. 668, 678 (1975).
ERISA governs a disparate power relationship between fiduciaries and beneficiaries that is
analogous to the power disparity in the employer/employee relationship.
66. Brown v. Coates, 253 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (then Circuit Judge Warren Burger
allowed punitive damages for breach of an agent's fiduciary duty).
67. Werkschull v. United California Bank, 85 Cal. App. 3d 981, 149 Cal. Rptr. 829
(1978).
68. County of Cook v. Barrett, 36 Ill. App. 3d 623, 344 N.E.2d 540 (1975) (county
entitled to recover $180,000 in bribes received by a county clerk who was held to be a fiduci-
ary; the absence of any resulting damage deemed irrelevant).
69. American Timber & Trading Co. v. Niedermeyer, 276 Or. 1135, 558 P.2d 1211
(1976) (corporate fiduciary liable to repay income diverted to himself as well as salary and
bonuses received while diverting income).
70. 653 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 968 (1981).
71. The Dependahl court merely stated,
We do not think punitive damages are provided for in ERISA. Ordinarily punitive
damages are not presumed; they are not the norm; and nowhere in ERISA are they
mentioned. If Congress had desired to provide for punitive damages, it could have
easily so stated, as it has in other acts.
Id. at 1216. As support for this broad statement, the court relied on Calhoun v. Falstaff
Brewing Corp., 478 F. Supp. 357 (E.D. Mo. 1979) and Hum v. Retirement Fund Trust, 424
F. Supp. 80 (C.D. Cal. 1976). Calhoun concerned a summary judgment motion by the same
parties who were defendants in Dependahl. The court said only that "[p]unitive damages are
not recoverable under ERISA." Calhoun, 478 F. Supp. at 359. The Calhoun court also
relied on Hum. While Hurn held that ERISA "permits no recovery of punitive damages,"
424 F. Supp. at 82, the Hum court, like the Dependahl and Calhoun courts, neglected to
provide any analysis in support of its conclusion. Thus, Dependahl is an analytical orphan,
though some other cases may provide foster parenting.
Perhaps the Dependahl court's statements about punitive damages under ERISA were
conclusory because they were dicta. The specific issue in Dependahl was whether punitive
damages were appropriate in a case of "interference with employee benefit plans."
Dependahl, 653 F.2d at 1216. This particular violation, which is analogous to a common law
tortious interference with contract claim, see id. at 1217, is covered by 29 U.S.C. § 1140.
Section 1140, like § 1109, relies on the remedial provisions of § 1132, which courts have used
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denied punitive damages have attempted to base their conclusions
on somewhat more substantial legal underpinnings. The court in
Russell v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co.,2 however, an-
alyzed the three sources in detail in upholding a punitive damage
award. Examination of these sources reveals the strength of the
Russell court's analysis.
A. Statutory Interpretation
Civil enforcement of ERISA is provided in section 1132(a) of
the Act:
A civil action may be brought- .
(2) by the Secretary, or by a participant, beneficiary or fiduci-
ary for appropriate relief under section 1109 of this title; (3)
by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any
act or practice which violates any provision of this sub-
chapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appro-
priate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to
enforce any 1 rovisions of this subchapter or the terms of the
plan . ...
Section 1132(a)(3), which is restricted to equitable relief, is the
remedy for violations of ERISA that are not caused by breaches of
fiduciary duty. Section 1132(a)(2), on the other hand, is far more
expansive, covering violations of the Act arising from fiduciary
breaches. Section 1109, which section 1132(a)(2) specifically incor-
porates, provides a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty, em-
powering members of a pension plan to sue fiduciaries.74 If the
fiduciaries are found liable for breaching their duty, they must com-
pensate the fund for any loss resulting from the breach and return
any profits they earned through the improper use of plan assets.75
Significant to the argument favoring an award of punitive damages
is the availability of "such other equitable or remedial relief as the
court may deem appropriate' 76 . This language gives courts broad
to allow punitive damages in appropriate circumstances. See cases cited supra note 15. But
see cases cited supra note 16. However, the Dependahl court found punitive damages inap-
propriate, inasmuch as it characterized the Dependahl defendants' wrongdoing as essentially
a breach of contract. The court said, "[t]he common law of contract refuses to allow an
award of punitive damages." Dependahl, 653 F.2d at 1217. Thus, the Dependahl court held
only that an award of punitive damages is inappropriate in a claim based on § 1140.
72. 722 F.2d 482 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 53 U.S.L.W. 4938 (U.S. June
25, 1985).
73. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2)-(3) (1982).
74. Id § 1109(a).
75. Id.
76. Id. (emphasis added).
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discretion to tailor appropriate relief."
Despite the existence of a remedy for breaches of fiduciary duty
in section 1132(a)(2), however, some courts seem to rely solely upon
the remedy for breaches not involving a fiduciary duty in section
1132(a)(3) to find that only equitable relief is available under ER-
ISA.78 In doing so, these courts misinterpret the statute. Congress
specifically created two separate provisions describing appropriate
relief in different terms. This distinction cannot be ignored. Ca-
nons of statutory construction require statutes to be read and con-
strued as a whole.79 Only equitable relief may be awarded under
section 1132(a)(3); both equitable and legal relief are allowed under
section 1132(a)(2). If the remedies available under section
1132(a)(2) were intended to be identical to those available under
section 1132(a)(3), then the reference in section 1132(a)(2) to sec-
tion 1109 would be mere surplusage, since the language of section
1132(a)(3) would otherwise necessarily encompass an action for
breach of fiduciary duties.
An inference that Congress included a completely unnecessary
provision is usually not assumed. 0 The interpretation that the ex-
tent of relief available under section 1132(a)(2) is different from that
available under 1132(a)(3) avoids this unsettling inference. A court
should prefer a construction that gives each element of the statute a
77. See generally Gallagher, supra note 10, at 763-64 (discussing breadth of fiduciary
provisions, fiduciary standard, and scope of both liability and relief); Pillsbury, supra note 50,
at 381 ("IlThe remedies available to ERISA claimants, although still undefined, are poten-
tially very broad because they may even include awards of punitive damages or damages for
emotional distress.").
78. See, e.g., Heine v. Clark Equip. Co., No. 82-C-1286 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 21, 1983) (avail-
able Nov. 10, 1984 on LEXIS, Genfed library, Cases file); Wardle v. Central States, Southeast
and Southwest Areas Pension Fund, PENS. REP. (BNA) No. 239, at D-1 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 23,
1979), affid on other grounds, 627 F.2d 820 (7th Cir. 1980), cerL denied, 449 U.S. 1112
(1981); Bell v. Southern Or. Log Scaling & Grading Bureau, No. 76-431 (D. Or. Aug. 5,
1976) (available Nov. 10, 1984 on LEXIS, Genfed library, Cases file).
79. Northwest Paper Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 344 F.2d 47, 50 (8th Cir. 1965); see
Cowden v. Montgomery County Soc'y for Cancer Control, 591 F. Supp. 740, 753 (S.D. Ohio
1984). But see Whitaker v. Texaco, Inc., 566 F. Supp. 745, 751 (N.D. Ga. 1983) ("Mhe
language of section 1109 ('equitable or remedial relief as the count [sic] may deem appropri-
ate') is sufficiently parallel to the language of section 1132(a)(3) ('appropriate equitable re-
lief') to prompt the conclusion that punitive damages are not available for breach of fiduciary
duty either.").
80. See, e.g., Zeigler Coal Co. v. Kleppe, 536 F.2d 398, 406 (D.C. Cir. 1976) ("[A]
statute should not be construed in such a way as to render certain provisions superfluous or
insignificant."); Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842, 856 (D.C. Cir.) ("[Al1 words and
provisions of statutes are intended to have meaning and are to be given effect, and words of a
statute are not to be construed as surplusage."), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 917 (1973); accord
Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Continental Oil Co., 548 F.2d 884 (10th Cir.
1977); Wadsworth v. Whaland, 562 F.2d 70 (1st Cir. 1977).
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different function."1 This is particularly relevant when Congress in-
cludes precise language in one section of a statute but omits it in
another section of the same act. "[I]t is generally presumed that
Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion
or exclusion." 2
The significant language in ERISA is the inclusion of "equitable
or remedial" relief for breaches of fiduciary duty while limiting re-
lief for general violations to "equitable." Remedial relief allows the
recovery of damages, a form of legal relief. The addition of "reme-
dial relief" under section 1132(a)(2) supports the conclusion that
both equitable and legal relief are available for breaches of fiduciary
duty. Since the fiduciary responsibility provisions are central to the
Act's purpose, 3 broader relief is available for breaches of fiduciary
duty than for other violations of the Act. This interpretation is con-
sistent with ERISA's general tone. 4
Within section 1109 the phrase "equitable or remedial" relief is
significant in itself, apart from the distinction discussed above. The
phrase would be meaningless if a discretionary award of punitive
damages was not contemplated by the Act. A court's equitable
power to order a fiduciary to personally restore a plan's status quo
can remedy any damage inflicted by a fiduciary's breach. Thus, the
court's discretionary power to award additional remedial relief
would never be exercised unless section 1109 envisions some action
against a fiduciary beyond returning the plan to its condition prior
to the breach. A limited interpretation of section 1132(a)(2) does
not give full effect to the Act. 5
Finally, ERISA provides for court removal of the fiduciary,86
criminal sanctions, including imprisonment, 87 and the award of rea-
sonable attorney's fees and costs. 8 8 These provisions and the Act's
81. United States v. Dinerstein, 362 F.2d 852, 855-56 (2d Cir. 1966).
82. United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1972).
83. See supra notes 30-47 and accompanying text.
84. The proper course in construing statutes is to "search out and follow the true intent
of the legislature and adopt that sense of words which harmonizes best with the context, and
promotes in the fullest manner, the apparent policy and objects of the legislature." Hattaway
v. United States, 304 F.2d 5, 9-10 (5th Cir. 1962) (quoting United States v. Winn, 28 F. Cas.
733, 734 (C.C.D. Mass. 1838) (No. 16,740)).
85. For discussion of this principle of statutory construction, see supra note 80.
86. 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a).
87. Id. § 1131.
88. Id. § 1132(g). It may be argued that punitive damages should not be available under
ERISA because a large award of attorney's fees provides the same deterrent effect. However,
this argument is susceptible to the same criticism as the argument discussed infra at notes 97-
100 and accompanying text. That is, the mere availability of one method of punishment and
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broad definition of a fiduciary89 evince ERISA's wide remedial
scope for breaches of fiduciary duties.9"
B. Legislative Purpose, History, and Policy
ERISA is a remedial statute9 ' explicitly enacted to safeguard
"the interests of participants in employee benefit plans and their
beneficiaries. . . by establishing standards of conduct, responsibil-
ity, and obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans, and by
providing for appropriate remedies, sanctions and ready access to
the Federal courts."92 The legislative history underlying the Act
exposes the breadth of these remedies and sanctions: "The enforce-
ment provisions have been designed specifically to provide both the
Secretary and participants and beneficiaries with broad remedies for
redressing or preventing violations of the Act. [Our intent] is to pro-
vide the full range of legal and equitable remedies available in both
state and Federal courts . . .,.
The use of the word "sanctions" in the Act and the apparent
Congressional intent to prevent violations of the Act indicate goals
of both punishment and deterrence. Courts rationalize punitive
damages on three bases: punishment, deterrence, and "as a private
aid to courts in enforcing established norms of conduct by compen-
deterrence does not necessarily mean that Congress intended to preclude other effective meth-
ods. An award of punitive damges is completely discretionary under § 1109. Therefore, in
those cases where exorbitant attorney's fees and costs would sufficiently fulfill the function of
punitive damages, the court need not award them. In those cases of egregious misconduct,
however, the court's power to award punitive damages allows it the discretion to impose
damages beyond the fixed amount of attorney's fees and costs. These fees and costs might be
low compared to recent punitive damage awards for breach of fiduciary duty. See, eg., infra
text accompanying notes 109-10 (discussing large punitive damage awards).
89. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text; see generally Little & Thrailkill, Fidu-
ciaries Under ERISA: A Narrow Path to Tread, 30 VAND. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1977) (discussing
fiduciaries, parties in interest, and disqualified persons).
90. It is a well-settled principle that remedial statutes are to be liberally construed to
effectuate their purposes. Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 65 (1968); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389
U.S. 332, 336 (1967).
91. "Unlike prior federal regulation, ERISA is directed specifically at the protection of
employees and the guaranteeing of their benefits. It is a 'pro-employee' act designed to pro-
vide a wide variety of safeguards and minimum standards with respect to the establishment,
operation, and administration of benefit plans." Lieben, supra note 4, at 429-30. The House
Report on an earlier version of ERISA stated that "the primary purpose of [ERISA] is the
protection of individual pension rights." H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1, reprinted
in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4639.
92. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1982) (emphasis added).
93. H.R. REP. No. 533, supra note 91, at 17, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 4655; S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 35, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 4838, 4871 (emphasis added).
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sating for otherwise non-compensable injuries." 94  Punitive dam-
ages, then, serve to effectuate the explicit goals Congress intended
for ERISA.
Beyond doubt, deterrence is the predominant justification for
punitive damages under ERISA. Deterrence becomes particularly
crucial in commercial settings where fiduciaries may abuse the pen-
sion funds and the responsibilities entrusted to them.
The need for punitive damages and the effect of deterrence is
most acute in the situation where the defendant tacitly deter-
mines that he will engage in wrongful conduct with the expecta-
tion of greater profits and run the risk of later paying
compensation for the conduct. In this situation, the defendant
finds it cheaper to pay damages, if necessary, than to proceed
lawfully. If the wrongdoer is assessed compensatory damages,
the maximum penalty will merely restore him to the status quo
and he is likely to resort to wrongful conduct again. On the
other hand, if punitive damages exist, the risk of a substantial
penalty may deter his wrongful conduct.
The deterrent value of punitive damages is greatest in affect-
ing commercial behavior.
95
Thus, without the threat of personal liability for punitive damages,
the fiduciary will be more likely to breach his duty because the only
civil remedy will be restoration to the status quo ante.
The Senate Report accompanying the ERISA legislation indi-
cates that Congress intended to deter ERISA violations. "Under
the bill, the Secretary of Labor and participants and beneficiaries of
a plan may bring civil actions for any appropriate legal or equitable
relief to redress or restrain a violation of fiduciary duties."96 Inas-
much as Congress understood the importance of restraining ERISA
violations, it provided for a wide variety of remedies. Punitive dam-
ages clearly fall within the full range of legal and equitable remedies
that Congress intended to provide for breaches of fiduciary duties.
Some district courts have used the availability of criminal penal-
ties97 in ERISA to justify denying punitive damages to remedy
breaches of fiduciary duties: "It is the opinion of this Court that
criminal penalties are a sufficient deterrence. . . such that punitive
damages are not necessary to protect the rights of plan participants
94. Comment, Punitive Damages: An Appeal for Deterrence, 61 NEB. L. REv. 651, 652
(1982).
95. Id. 653-63.
96. S. REP. No. 383, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 104, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 4890, 4988 (emphasis added).
97. 29 U.S.C. § 1131 (1982).
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and beneficiaries created thereby."98 The mere availability of crimi-
nal sanctions, however, should not preclude an effective alternative
for deterrence.
One commentator discussing the availability of punitive dam-
ages under statutes providing both criminal and civil sanctions
noted that "[t]o dispose of their availability merely because a crimi-
nal law exists is to remove an effective method for deterring outra-
geous conduct."99 Other commentators have observed that much
criminal conduct is rarely prosecuted and that crimes involving un-
lawful commercial behavior "depend on the threat of civil punish-
ment for effective enforcement."'' °
The availability of criminal sanctions should not be interpreted
to exclude other deterrents. Congress intended to provide a greater
remedy than compensatory damages. It enacted the criminal provi-
sions to punish the wrongdoer. Foreclosure of punitive damage
awards by the availability of criminal sanctions would nullify Con-
gressional intent in cases of malicious noncompliance with fiduciary
duties where the court is reluctant to invoke the criminal penalties.
Opponents of the recovery of punitive damages for breach of
fiduciary duty use yet another rationale to justify their view. They
argue that the protection of individual pension rights must be bal-
anced against the burden of the increased cost of assuring the con-
tinuation of voluntary pension and benefit plans. The court in
Whitaker v. Texaco'0 ' adopted such a view. Reasoning that puni-
tive damages would so burden employers that they would lose in-
centive to maintain private pension plans,10 the court cited Senator
Nelson's comments during the floor debate on ERISA: "[I]n the
case of those requirements which add to the cost of financing pen-
sion plans, Congress tried to adopt provisions which strike a bal-
ance between providing a meaningful protection for the employees
and keeping the costs within reasonable limits for employers."'' 3
The legislative history of ERISA reveals, however, that the pro-
jected increases in costs that concerned Congress were those associ-
ated with the recurring regulation requirements imposed by the
Act, such as the new minimum funding and vesting require-
98. Meyer v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 1232, 1236 (E.D. Mo. 1983); see Whita-
ker v. Texaco, Inc., 566 F. Supp. 745, 751 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
99. Comment, supra note 94, at 665.
100. Mallor & Roberts, Punitive Damages: Toward a Principled Approach, 31 HASTINGS
L.J. 639, 656-57 (1980).
101. Whitaker, 566 F. Supp. 745 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
102. Id. at 751.
103. Id. at 751 n.8.
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ments. 1  Unfixed and unexpected punitive damages are not a fore-
seeable cost that would dissuade an employer from adopting an
ERISA-regulated pension plan. Furthermore, punitive damage
awards do not "add to the cost of financing pension plans" because
they are exacted from the personal assets of the breaching fiduciary
and not from the plan assets.1"5
Moreover, the legislative history shows Congress' intent to en-
graft principles of the law of trusts onto the fiduciary duty provi-
sions of ERISA. °6 One reason articulated by Congress for this
incorporation is that a plan participant "is not equipped to safe-
guard either his own rights or the plan assets."' 7 The law of trusts
contemplates use of punitive damages to protect beneficiaries."'8
Congress intended that punitive damages be available in ERISA to
protect defenseless plan participants from breaches by pension plan
fiduciaries.
Not only have punitive damages traditionally been awarded in
the trust context, but such awards have increasingly become a ma-
jor aspect of recovery. In Estate of Anderson,109 the court awarded
appreciation damages of $885,160, more than half of the total
award, for an improper sale of real property from the decedent's
estate. A jury awarded $3,000,000 in punitive damages against a
trustee in Estate of Pitzer1 1 o for intentional infliction of emotional
distress. In relying on trust principles, then, Congress plainly in-
tended that punitive damages be available against ERISA
fiduciaries.
104. See H.R. REP. No. 533, supra note 91, at 13-14, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS at 4651-52.
105. 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (1982).
106. H.L REP. No. 533, supra note 91, at 11, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 4649-51 ("The fiduciary responsibility section, in essence, codifies and makes appli-
cable to these fiduciaries certain principles developed in the evolution of the law of trusts.");
S. REP. No. 127, supra note 93, at 28, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at
4864-65.
107. H.R. REP. No. 533, supra note 91, at 11, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 4649-5 1; S. REP. No. 127, supra note 93, at 28, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS at 4864-65.
108. See generally BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 862, at 39-41 (2d ed.
rev. 1982) (consequential and exemplary damages may be recovered in suits for breach of
trust); 3 ScoTr, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 205, at 1665 n.1 (3d ed. 1967 & Supp. 1984) (puni-
tive damages recoverable upon showing of willful, malicious, or wanton conduct).
109. 149 Cal. App. 3d 336, 196 Cal. Rptr. 782 (1983).
110. 155 Cal. App. 3d 979, 202 Cal. Rptr. 855 (1984).
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C. Availability of Punitive Damages Under Analogous Law
The Eighth Circuit's intimation in Dependahl1. that punitive
damages are available in statutory causes of action only if the words
"punitive damages" themselves are explicitly used' 12 is erroneously
simplistic. Courts have allowed punitive damages even where Con-
gress has not explicitly authorized them. Consider, for example, the
Landrum-Griffin Act, known as the bill of rights for union mem-
bers. 113 The Landrum-Griffin Act unilaterally protects the rights of
union members as ERISA protects the rights of plan participants.
As in ERISA, Congress did not expressly provide for the recovery
of punitive damages under Landrum-Griffin. Yet, enforcement of
the latter Act through "such relief. . . as may be appropriate," '114
consistently has been held to include such awards." 5 Several ER-
ISA cases, including Russell, have relied on this analogous Lan-
drum-Griffin Act language in allowing punitive damages against
pension plan fiduciaries. 16
Cases interpreting the Landrum-Griffin Act have looked to its
underlying purposes to determine whether to allow punitive dam-
ages. Even though these purposes were not fully clear, one court
found a legislative intent to "protect the individual rights of union
members and to deter abuse and denial thereof by union of-
ficers.""' 7 In proper cases, punitive damage awards will serve this
purpose.'8
The purpose of ERISA also is unilaterally protective: "to pro-
tect. . . the interests of participants in employee benefit plans and
their beneficiaries. . . by establishing standards of conduct, respon-
sibility, and obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans, and
by providing for appropriate remedies, sanctions and ready access
to the Federal courts.""' Yet the legislative history of ERISA is
111. See Dependahl, 653 F.2d at 1216.
112. See supra note 71.
113. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, § 101, 29 U.S.C. § 411
(1982).
114. 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1982).
115. See, e.g., Bise v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 618 F.2d 1299, 1305 (9th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 904 (1980); Morrissey v. National Maritime Union of Am., 544
F.2d 19, 24-25 (2d Cir. 1976); Cooke v. Orange Belt Dist. Council of Painters No. 48, 529
F.2d 815, 820 (9th Cir. 1976); International Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Braswell, 388 F.2d 193,
199-201 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 935 (1968).
116. See Russell, 722 F.2d at 491-92; Jiminez v. Pioneer Diecasters, 549 F. Supp. 677,
680-81 (C.D. Cal. 1982); Eaton v. D'Amato, 581 F. Supp. 743, 748 (D.D.C. 1980).
117. Bise, 618 F.2d at 1305 n.6.
118. Id.
119. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1982).
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more explicit in the scope of its remedies than is the Landrum-Grif-
fin Act. Congress intended that the enforcement provisions of ER-
ISA "provide the full range of legal and equitable remedies
available in both state and Federal courts."12
Judicial consistency demands that these similarly protective
statutes be given harmonious interpretations.12 The recoverability
of punitive damages under the Landrum-Griffin Act without ex-
plicit statutory authorization compels the same treatment under the
unilaterally protective fiduciary provisions of ERISA.
Some courts have denied punitive damages under ERISA by re-
lying on other statutes that also fail to specify whether such dam-
ages are recoverable and which have been interpreted to deny them.
One of these is Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,122 which
has been uniformly interpreted to prohibit such awards.1 23 The sig-
nificant language of Title VII enables the court to order "other equi-
table relief as the court deems appropriate." 1 24 This language is
comparable to that in section 1132(a)(3) of ERISA: "other appro-
priate equitable relief."125 Thus, the analogy to Title VII is tenable
with respect to violations under section 1132(a)(3), which prohibits
punitive damages in causes of action other than breach of fiduciary
duty. Both Title VII and section 1132(a)(3) use only the words "eq-
uitable relief." However, the inclusion of a discretionary award of
"equitable or remedial" '26 relief for breach of fiduciary duty in ER-
ISA section 1109, which section 1132(a)(2) incorporates by refer-
ence, shows Congress' desire for relief broader than Title VII's.
The prohibition against punitive damage awards under Title VII is
therefore irrelevant to a suit brought under section 1132(a)(2) for
breach of fiduciary duty.127
120. H.R. REP. No. 533, supra note 91, at 17, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 4655; S. REP. No. 127, supra note 93, at 35, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 4871.
121. Statutes containing similar language and sharing a common raison d'etre should be
interpreted in a like manner. Northcross v. Board of Educ., 412 U.S. 427, 428 (1973).
122. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).
123. See, eg., Walker v. Ford Motor Co., 684 F.2d 1355, 1363-65 (11th Cir. 1982) (col-
lecting cases). But cf Williams v. Trans World Airlines, 660 F.2d 1267, 1272 (8th Cir. 1981)
(Title VII may allow compensatory damages). Cases relying on the denial of punitive dam-
ages in Title VII cases to justify denying such damages in ERISA cases include Whitaker v.
Texaco, Inc., 566 F. Supp. 745, 752 (N.D. Ga. 1983); Bell v. Southern Or. Log Scaling &
Grading Bureau, No. 76-431 (D. Or. Aug. 5, 1976) (available Nov. 10, 1984 on LEXIS,
Genfed library, Cases file).
124. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982).
125. 29 U.S.C. § I132(a)(3) (1982).
126. Id § 1109.
127. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634
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Courts also have analogized ERISA to the Labor Management
Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act (LMRA)128 and the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA),'29 both of which usually are held to disal-
low punitive damages. 130 These courts reason that punitive dam-
ages are prohibited under ERISA because these other labor laws do
not allow such remedies. 31 A critical distinction, however, between
ERISA and these labor laws makes a comparative analysis regard-
ing punitive damages inappropriate.
Most labor laws have "bilateral purposes" as compared with the
"unilateral protective function" apparent in both ERISA and the
Landrum-Griffin Act. 132 That is, the LMRA and the NLRA at-
tempt to balance the interests of either the employer and employee
or the union officer and union member, rather than focusing on the
rights of the beneficiary (in ERISA) or the union member (in Lan-
drum-Griffin).1 33 When a statute thus seeks to balance competing
interests, punitive damages are inappropriate for several reasons. 34
First, the damages defeat these labor laws' fundamental purpose
of encouraging private resolution through mediation, conciliation
and compromise. 135 The availability of punitive damages would en-
courage litigation to the detriment of settlement. ERISA, by con-
trast, does not encourage a beneficiary to compromise for less than
what is fully owed him. Rather, ERISA is unilaterally protective.
(1982), has also been analogized to ERISA. Whitaker, 566 F. Supp. 745, at 752. The com-
parison to the ADEA was not the sole ground for decision in Whitaker, and no other court
has drawn such an analogy. Whitaker implies that the ADEA, which uses language similar
to ERISA's, has been uniformly interpreted to prohibit punitive damages. However, the
proposition that punitive damages are disallowed under ADEA has yet to be universally
accepted by the courts or commentators. See, eg., Wise v. Olan Mills Inc., 485 F. Supp. 542,
545 (D. Colo. 1980) (punitive damage award allowed under ADEA). Accord Kennedy v.
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 449 F. Supp. 1008, 1011 (D. Colo. 1978). See also Com-
ment, Punitive Damages Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 33 HASTINGS L.J.
457, 483-84 (1981) (punitive damages are necessary and appropriate to effectuate purposes of
ADEA).
128. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-188 (1982).
129. Id. §§ 151-166.
130. See International Union, UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634, 646 (1958) (no punitive
damages allowed under NLRA); Tippett v. Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co., 316 F. Supp. 292,
298 (M.D.N.C. 1970) (no punitive damages under LMRA).
131. See, e.g., Hechenberger v. Western Elec. Co., 570 F. Supp. 820, 822 (E.D. Mo.
1983); Whitaker v. Texaco, Inc., 566 F. Supp. 745, 752 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
132. See supra notes 113-19 and accompanying text.
133. See Eaton v. D'Amato, 581 F. Supp. 743, 747-48 (D.D.C. 1980).
134. See Shaller, The Availability of Punitive Damages in Breach of Contract Actions
Under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 50 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 219,
231-34 (1982).
135. See id. at 234-35.
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Second, Congress enacted the LMRA after judicial decisions ad-
dressing this situation had disallowed punitive damages. 136 Con-
gress did not explicitly reject the courts' holdings, thus implicitly
affirming them. 137 Consequently, Congress' failure explicitly to au-
thorize punitive damages in the LMRA means something quite dif-
ferent from its failure explicitly to authorize punitive damages in
ERISA. When ERISA was adopted, the common law of trusts pro-
vided for awards of punitive damages for breach of fiduciary
duty. a1 3 Furthermore, "[p]unitive damages long have been imposed
in contract cases that have a decidedly tortious flavor, such as those
involving. . . breach of fiduciary duty." 139 Thus, Congress' silence
in this regard should be viewed as approval of the established prac-
tice of allowing punitive damages in ERISA-type cases.
Finally, judgments under most labor laws are enforceable
against union assets. Punitive damages are, therefore, less desirable
because they punish all union members. Under ERISA, however,
the breaching fiduciary, not the pension fund beneficiaries, would be
personally liable for any punitive damages awarded.1" Moreover,
the discretionary language of section 1109 provides additional re-
medial relief only in appropriate circumstances, such as when the
funds of the pension plan will not be used to satisfy the award. In
sum, whether punitive damages are permitted under a labor statute
depends on whether that statute has a unilateral or bilateral pur-
pose. Statutes that have bilateral purposes, like the LMRA or the
NLRA, generally do not contemplate punitive damage awards,
while statutes with unilateral purposes, like the Landrum-Grilfin
Act, typically employ such awards as part of their protective
scheme. Inasmuch as ERISA resembles the Landrum-Griffin Act
in its protective approach to beneficiaries' rights, punitive damages
are an appropriate ERISA remedy.
136. See, eg., Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7 (1940) (NLRB cannot assess
punitive damages against a party who commits an unfair labor practice). See generally
Shaller, supra note 133 at 221-23 (discussing Republic Steel case).
137. See Shaller, supra note 133, at 223. Cf Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.
v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 378-382 (1982) (when Congress legislates in a context where a rem-
edy has already been supplied by courts, it intends by its silence to authorize the judicial
remedy).
138. See supra notes 106-10 and accompanying text.
139. Mallor & Roberts, supra note 100, at 659. See also Sullivan, Punitive Damages in the
Law of Contracts: The Reality and the Illusion of Legal Change, 61 MINN. L. REv. 207, 226-
29 (discussing punitive damages for breach of fiduciary duty).
140. See 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (1982).
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III. CONCLUSION
The fiduciary responsibility provisions of ERISA are pivotal in
Title I's protection of employee benefit rights, the heart of ERISA's
protective purpose. In fact, the need for stringent fiduciary stan-
dards spurred the passage of the Act. Therefore, it is not surprising
that Congress provided a greater breadth of relief for breach of fidu-
ciary duty than for other violations of the Act. The limited lan-
guage of section 1132(a)(3) only proscribes punitive damages for
general violations. The breach of fiduciary standards, however, is a
more serious violation, and an award of punitive damages is within
the discretion of the court under section 1132(a)(2), which incorpo-
rates section 1109. Damages are to be extracted from the breaching
fiduciary, not from the plan assets.
This conclusion follows from the plain meaning of ERISA and
its legislative history. Congress intended to provide courts with
broad remedial power to prevent violations of the Act. It gave them
the "full range of legal and equitable remedies available.""'4 Fur-
thermore, principles of the law of trusts, incorporated into the Act,
allow recovery of punitive damages for breach of fiduciary duty.
Punitive damages also are justified through reference to analo-
gous statutes. For example, ERISA is like the Landrum-Griffin Act
in that both have unilaterally protective purposes. Courts have held
that punitive damages are recoverable under Landrum-Griffin.
Similarly, such damages should be permitted under ERISA. Stat-
utes under which courts have denied punitive damages are distin-
guishable from ERISA. Such statutes, like the LMRA and NLRA,
seek to balance competing interests in labor-management relations.
They do not embody the unilaterally protective feature of ERISA
and, therefore, are irrelevant to any discussion of punitive damages
under ERISA.
Finally, allowing recovery of punitive damages under ERISA
bolsters its criminal provisions and furthers the important public
policy of deterring abuses in the commercial setting. One court has
noted, "While the availability of such relief may be preferable as a
matter of public policy, it is not the role of this Court to make such
policy judgments."' 42 Full analysis of ERISA reveals, however,
that ERISA embodies a congressional policy in favor of punitive
damages.
ERISA is a landmark piece of labor legislation whose parame-
141. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
142. Meyer v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 1232, 1236 (E.D. Mo. 1983).
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ters are still being defined eleven years after its adoption. As the
diversity in judicial opinion reveals, the resolution of the statute's
ambiguity is not self-evident. However, when one considers the
combined authority of the legislative history accompanying ERISA,
analogous statutes, and policy considerations, it becomes apparent
that discretionary awards of punitive damages should be allowed in
appropriate cases for breaches of fiduciary duties.
DEBORAH A. GEIER
